



















quality	of	democracy,	evaluated	by	empirical	 translations	of	 control,	equality	and	 freedom,	can	be	
observed	regarding	output	(policy	targets	etc.)	and	with	certain	limitations	regarding	outcome	(GHG	
emission	 development).	 Research	 results	 are	 robust	 and	 show	 synergy	 in	 terms	 of	 detailed	
mechanisms	verifying	statistical	trends.	An	initially	outlined	concept	of	democratic	efficacy	explains	
these	 findings	 by	 theorizing	 that	 democracy’s	 ability	 to	 produce	 desired	 and	 intended	 climate	
performances	rises	with	increasing	quality	of	democracy.	Empirical	analysis	is	conducted	by	applying	
an	explanatory	mixed	methods	design.	 Firstly,	 panel	 regressions	deliver	 trends	on	 the	 influence	of	
the	 quality	 of	 democracy,	 as	measured	 by	 the	Democracy	 Barometer,	 on	 climate	 performance,	 as	
measured	 by	 the	 Climate	 Change	 Performance	 Index.	 Depending	 on	 combination	 of	 data,	 the	
number	 of	 countries	 ranges	 from	39	 to	 41	 in	 2004	 to	 2012	 resulting	 in	 193	 to	 326	 country-years.	
Secondly,	 a	 case	 study	 of	 Canada’s	 Kyoto	 Protocol	 process	 from	 1995	 to	 2012	 follows,	 providing	
detailed	 insights	 into	 the	mechanisms	 of	 the	 quality	 of	 democracy	 and	 climate	 performance.	 The	
findings	 are	 based	 on	 documentary	 analysis	 and	 27	 interviews	with	 former	ministers,	MPs,	NGOs,	
























The	wicked	 problem	 climate	 change	 combines	 a	 set	 of	 characteristics	making	 it	 very	 hard	 to	 deal	
with,	such	as	latency,	a	long	time	horizon,	scientific	complexity	and	free-riding	problems.	These	call	
in	 sum	 for	 a	 broad-scale	 transformation	of	 contemporary	 societies	 in	many	 fields,	 such	 as	 energy,	





of	 climate	 change	 deal	 with	 unintended	 consequences	 they	 inherently	 produce,	 such	 as	 the	
periodicity	of	elections	leading	to	short-termism,	“cycling	issue	attention”	threatening	“enlightened	
understanding”	 and	 dilatory	 as	 well	 as	 incremental	 procedures	 weakening	 their	 problem-solving	
capacities	 (see,	 e.g.,	 Brodocz,	 2008;	 Held,	 2014).	 Though	 characteristics	 of	 climate	 change	 and	
unintended	 consequences	 of	 democracy	 might	 contradict	 each	 other	 to	 different	 degrees,	 some	
democracies	may	 find	better	 solutions	 than	others	 to	overcome	 their	 short-termism	 to	be	 able	 to	
deal	with	the	long	time	horizon	of	climate	change.	Hence,	different	levels	of	democracy	might	be	an	
explanatory	factor	for	differences	in	the	climate	performances	of	established	democracies.		
Existent	 research	 cannot	 explain	 this	 observation	 (see,	 e.g.,	 Bernauer,	 2013;	 Burnell,	 2012;	 Cao,	
Milner,	Prakash,	&	Ward,	2014;	Held,	2014).	The	possibly	most	comprehensive	and	relevant	study	in	
this	 context	merely	 delivers	 insights	 on	 trends	 regarding	 the	 spectrum	of	 autocracy	 to	 democracy	
(Bättig	&	Bernauer,	2009).	The	authors	study	a	cross-section	of	185	countries	between	1990-2004,	
arguing	 that	 democratic	 institutions	 provide	 public	 goods	more	 successfully	 than	 autocratic	 ones.	
Their	empirical	results	demonstrate	that	the	effect	of	democracy	on	climate	policy	commitments	 is	
positive	but	ambiguous	in	terms	of	GHG	emissions.	However,	the	empirical	data	used	is	not	able	to	
differentiate	 between	 democracies.	 The	 methods	 used	 are	 not	 capable	 of	 providing	 insights	 into	
detailed	 mechanisms	 verifying	 statistical	 trends.	 The	 theoretical	 literature	 on	 political	 institutions	











important	 for	 dynamic	 policy	 processes,	 “qualitative	 case	 studies	 based	 on	 ‘thick	 description’	 of	
climate	policy	making	remain	crucial”	(Bernauer,	2013,	p.	436).	 In	particular,	studies	do	not	explain	
comprehensively	 what	 mechanisms	 exist	 inside	 democracies	 to	 understand	 different	 reactions	 to	
climate	change.	Such	mechanisms	can	also	verify	or	reject	the	previously	detected	trends.	This	gap	
results	 in	 a	 case	 study	 on	 Canada’s	 Kyoto	 Protocol	 process	 1995-2012	 asking	 what	 mechanisms	
underlie	 democratic	 quality	 and	 climate	 performance	 (“Analysis	 II”).	 Thirdly,	 the	 focus	 of	 research	
has	 so	 far	 been	 placed	 on	 description	 rather	 than	 on	 explanation	 and	 development	 of	 applicable	




Findings	of	 the	study	demonstrate	that	more	democratic	quality	 influences	climate	performance	 in	
established	democracies	mostly	positively.	The	positive	influence	can	be	observed	regarding	output	
but	 only	 with	 limitations	 regarding	 outcome.	 Research	 results	 of	 both	 analyses	 are	 robust	 and	
synergize	 in	 terms	 of	 detailed	 mechanisms	 verifying	 statistical	 trends.	 Furthermore,	 explored	
mechanisms	indicate	that	the	influence	might	become	stronger	and	more	predictable	with	increasing	
levels	of	democratic	quality.	The	 initially	outlined	concept	of	democratic	efficacy	can	explain	 these	






























Democratic	 quality	 indicates	 the	 level	 of	 democracy	 and	 relies	 on	 a	 “pure”	 understanding	 of	
democracy.	 Applied	 to	 Lincoln’s	 famous	 distinction,	 a	 pure	 understanding	 has	 to	 be	 vastly	
understood	as	“government	of	the	people”	and	“by	the	people”.		
Having	 identified	 (1)	 meta-dimensions	 as	 overall	 guiding	 principles,	 (2)	 dimensions	 of	 democratic	
quality	as	 conceptual	 criteria	 can	be	empirically	 translated	 into	 (3)	evaluative	 standards	 stipulating	















equal	 opportunities	 to	 do	 so.	 Control	 as	 the	 third	 principle	 ensures	 that	 the	 will	 of	 the	 demos	 is	
accountably	 implemented	under	 rule	of	 law,	 so	 that	 their	understanding	of	equality	 is	actually	put	
into	 effect.	 Thus,	 freedom,	 control	 and	 equality	 are	much	more	 enabling	 than	 contradicting	 each	
other.	



























“decision-takers”	 or	 electors	 in	 representative	 democracies	 can	 demand	 from	 decision-makers	 or	
those	 elected	 for	 the	 decisions	 and	 policies	made	 (see,	 e.g.,	 Przeworski,	 Stokes,	 &	Manin,	 1999).	
Horizontal	 control	 is	 the	 control	 of	 decision-makers	 by	 other	 (state)	 institutions	 that	 have	 the	
possibility	to	check	and	monitor	their	decisions	(see,	e.g.,	Bovens,	2007;	O'Donnell,	1994).	The	main	
feature	 of	 independence	 as	 the	 second	 dimension	 of	 control	 is	 rule	 of	 law	 at	 an	 institutional	 and	
organizational	level.	A	free	and	open	access	of	the	judiciary	needs	to	be	established	for	a	high-quality	
democracy.	Moreover,	it	is	important	to	make	authorities	respect	the	law	and	establish	supremacy	of	
law.	 This	 means	 that	 there	 is	 no	 connection	 between	 judiciary	 and	 legislature	 or	 executive	 that	
hinders	 independent	 decisions	 or	 enables	 corruption.	 Thus,	 the	 judiciary	 has	 to	 be	 highly	
professionalized	 (see,	 e.g.,	 Keith,	 2002;	 La	 Porta,	 Lopez-de-Silanes,	 Pop-Eleches,	 &	 Shleifer,	 2004).	
Stability	 as	 the	 third	 dimension	 related	 to	 control	 guarantees	 that	 a	 state	 is	 embedded	 in	 stable	
democratic	structures,	which	has	to	be	secured	in	many	different	branches.	Stability	is	characterized	
by	 governmental	 capability	 including	 constraints	 of	 the	 constitutional	 and	 executive	 power,	 the	
absence	 of	 destabilizing	 circumstances	 and	 sufficient	 resources	 for	 democratic	 institutions.	 A	
democratic	 government	 has	 to	 have	 the	 ability	 and	 autonomy	 to	 govern	 the	 political	 process	
effectively	and	implement	policies	based	on	democratic	procedures	(see,	e.g.,	Etzioni,	1968;	Harmel	
&	 Robertson,	 1986;	 Scharpf,	 1999).	 Therefore,	 it	 needs	 different	 kinds	 of	 resources	 like	 public	
support	 (see,	 e.g.,	 Chanley,	 Rudolph,	 &	 Rahn,	 2000;	 Rudolph	 &	 Evans,	 2005).	 At	 the	 same	 time,	
mutual	constraints	of	the	constitutional	powers	and	the	executives	are	necessary.	They	can	be	found	
in	 veto-powers	 like	 an	 opposition	 with	 corresponding	 rights	 or	 control	 institutions	 with	 sufficient	
resources	 to	 oversee	 governmental	 policies	 and	 inform	 the	 public	 about	 it	 (see,	 e.g.,	 Hamilton,	
Madison,	 &	 Jay,	 2014;	 Schneider,	 2003;	 Tsebelis,	 1995).	 Moreover,	 the	 absence	 of	 destabilizing	
circumstances	and	sufficient	resources	for	democratic	institutions	are	important	for	the	stability	of	a	
democratic	 system.	 This	 means	 that	 statehood	 always	 has	 to	 be	 guaranteed	 while	 extreme	 staff	





involvement	 of	 a	 plurality	 of	 actors.	 This	 includes	 the	 involvement	 of	 those	 relevant	 and	 possibly	
affected	 or	 their	 arguments	 –	 like	 in	 the	 case	 of	 future	 generations	 –	 so	 they	 can	 influence	 the	
formulation	and	implementation	of	decisions.	Such	actors	can	be	labeled	as	holders	since	they	own	a	




live,	 spokespersons	 have	 interest	 and	 representatives	 possess	 status	 (Schmitter,	 2002,	 pp.	 62-63).	
The	selection	of	holders	must	be	fair	and	unbiased,	so	that	there	is	no	disproportionality	(see,	e.g.,	
Holden,	 2006;	 Teorell,	 2006;	 Urbinati	 &	Warren,	 2008).	 Moreover,	 weak	 and	 marginalized	 actors	
need	special	consideration	including	appropriate	arrangements	and	resource	accessibility	to	be	able	
to	participate.	Participation	as	a	second	dimension	requires	not	only	the	right	to	participate,	but	first	
and	 foremost	 a	high	 rate	of	 active	participants	 to	be	democratic	 since	arguments	 could	otherwise	
not	 be	 voiced	 and	 heard	 (see,	 e.g.,	 Barber,	 1984;	 Powell,	 2004;	 Teorell,	 2006).	 Thus,	 influence	 on	
decision-making	 due	 to	 adequate	 participation	 mechanisms	 (such	 as	 direct,	 intermediary,	
representative	 etc.)	 is	 necessary.	 When	 these	 participation	 mechanisms	 are	 based	 on	 considered	
judgment	of	equals,	 they	could	be	 labeled	deliberative,	which	can	be	observed	 in	a	 justification	of	
policy	proposals	in	regard	to	the	common	good	and	the	adjustment	of	positions	of	other	actors.	All	
this	 can	 result	 in	 responsiveness	 reflecting	 the	 results	 of	 considered	 judgments	 also	 during	 the	





that	 all	 actors	 are	prepared.	Moreover,	 the	 state	has	 to	 provide	 its	 citizens	 (or	 the	democratically	
legitimized	 actors	 involved)	 with	 access	 to	 all	 relevant	 documents	 to	 make	 the	 political	 process	
publicly	visible	(see,	e.g.,	Islam,	2006).	Informal	meetings	have	to	be	minimalized	and	democratically	
justified	 since	 secrecy	 enables	 the	 domination	 of	 particular	 interests	 and	 corruption	 (see,	 e.g.,	
Hollyer,	Rosendorff,	&	Vreeland,	2011;	Lindstedt	&	Naurin,	2010).	
Freedom	 as	 a	 meta-dimension	 secures	 creativity,	 liberty	 and	 publicity.	 Creativity	 as	 the	 first	
dimension	can	be	 reached	by	competition,	experimentation	and	 innovation,	which	enable	 creative	
potentials	for	more	democracy	(see,	e.g.,	Smith,	2009).	Science	plays	an	important	part	 in	terms	of	
creativity	since	a	functioning	democracy	needs	informed	citizens	to	develop	democratic	innovations.	
Moreover,	 free-thinking	science	and	openness	to	new	 ideas	and	concepts	 is	central	 for	democratic	
renewal.	 Competition	 as	 another	 source	 of	 creativity	 has	 to	 be	 seen	 in	 a	 range	 of	 actors	 being	
involved	 in	 decision-making	 processes	 or	 elections	 with	 different	 views	 on	 the	 issue	 under	
consideration	(see,	e.g.,	Bartolini,	1999,	2000).	Such	a	diverse	setting	can	also	result	in	diverse	policy	
options	as	a	result	of	the	process.	Also,	for	the	actors	themselves,	competition	seems	to	be	a	source	
for	 more	 creative	 results	 and	 positions	 (see,	 e.g.,	 Morlino,	 2012).	 Experimentation	 with	 not-yet	





a	 functioning	democracy	 (see,	 e.g.,	 Keith,	 2002;	O'Donnell,	 2004).	 Civil	 rights	 of	 belief,	 expression,	
physical	 integrity	 etc.	 enable	 personal	 autonomy	 and	 must	 not	 only	 exist,	 but	 also	 be	 actively	
implemented	by	their	states.	Political	rights	like	the	freedom	of	association	empower	an	active	public	
sphere	and	 the	existence	of	a	variety	of	organizations	 (see,	e.g.,	 Linz	&	Stepan,	1996).	 If	 there	 is	a	
free	 and	easy	way	 for	 individuals	 to	 establish	organizations	 and	 if	 these	organizations	 can	act	 and	
express	 themselves	autonomously	without	 repressing	 influence	by	 third	parties,	 it	can	be	assumed	
that	 freedom	exists	at	an	organizational	 level.	Media	pluralism	and	a	 free	public	 sphere	guarantee	
publicity	 as	 the	 third	dimension	of	 freedom	 (see,	 e.g.,	 Putnam,	 Leonardi,	&	Nanetti,	 1993;	 Sartori,	
1987;	Teorell,	2006;	Young,	1999).	It	is	important	that	different	media	are	in	place	since	they	enable	
discourse	 and	 express	 opinions	 for	 public	 debate	 and	 judgment.	 The	 result	 can	 be	 an	 active	 civil	
society	making	their	voices	heard.	It	is	therefore	necessary	that	states	support	media	pluralism	and	
public	 debate	 through	 conferences,	 an	 active	 press	 office,	 publications	 etc.	 Media	 also	 has	 the	
function	 to	 control	 political	 processes	 and	 to	 raise	 public	 awareness	 for	 certain	 information	
otherwise	 not	 accessible	 for	 individuals.	 Moreover,	 scientific	 results	 need	 to	 be	 translated	 and	




General	 performance	 is	 a	 “consequentialist”	 understanding	 of	 democracy	 that	 every	 state	 can	
perform	regardless	of	whether	 it	 is	democratic	or	autocratic.	 In	Lincoln’s	words,	a	consequentialist	
understanding	of	democracy	is	“government	for	the	people”	and	in	terms	of	climate	change	perhaps	
also	“for	the	planet”.		
As	 already	 indicated,	 general	 performance	 can	 be	 divided	 into	 procedural	 (see,	 e.g.,	 Back	 &	
Hadenius,	2008;	Charron	&	Lapuente,	2010;	Eckstein,	1971;	Roller,	2005;	Weaver	&	Rockman,	1993)	
and	substantive	general	performance	(see,	e.g.,	Lane	&	Ersson,	2000;	Pennock,	1966;	Roller,	2005).	



















Stability	builds	 the	 second	dimension	 (see,	e.g.,	Bertelsmann-Stiftung,	2014a	 (Management	 Index);	
Eckstein,	 1971;	 Kaufmann,	 Kraay,	 &	 Zoido-Lobatón,	 1999;	 Weaver	 &	 Rockman,	 1993).	 To	




























of	 policies	 (see,	 e.g.,	 Bertelsmann-Stiftung,	 2014b	 (Management	 Index);	 Longo,	 2008;	 Weaver	 &	
Rockman,	 1993).	 Hence,	 substantive	 general	 performance	 can	 be	 divided	 into	 policy	 output	 and	








The	 study	 proposes	 an	 argument	 and	 related	 outline	 for	 a	 concept	 of	 democratic	 efficacy	 as	 the	
ability	of	democracy	to	produce	desired	or	 intended	climate	performance.	Therefore,	the	empirical	
and	argumentative	context	 is	 considered	 in	order	 to	present	 the	concept	of	democratic	efficacy	 in	
the	form	of	a	drafted	model,	hypothesis	and	questions.	
Arguments	assuming	a	negative	impact	of	democratic	quality	on	climate	performance	firstly	rely	on	
the	 description	 of	 climate	 change	 as	 a	wicked	 problem	with	 characteristics	 like	 a	 shortening	 time	
horizon,	 scientific	 complexity,	 free-riding	 possibilities,	 unforeseen	 tipping	 points,	 high	 demands	 on	
global	cooperation	etc.	requiring	a	reflexive	policy	design	(Huitema	et	al.,	2011;	Jordan,	van	Asselt,	
Berkhout,	 Huitema,	 &	 Rayner,	 2012;	 Koppenjan	 &	 Klijn,	 2004;	 Lazarus,	 2009;	 Levin,	 Cashore,	
Bernstein,	&	Auld,	2007,	2012;	Rae	&	Wong,	2012;	Rittel	&	Webber,	1973;	Sandler,	2010;	Shearman	
&	Smith,	2007;	A.	Thompson,	2006).	Secondly,	democracies	in	the	context	of	climate	change	are	also	
threatened	 by	 characteristics	 of	 the	 democratic	 process	 itself	 like	 a	 periodicity	 of	 elections	 with	
short-time	horizons,	“cycling	issue	attention”	undermining	“enlightened	understanding”,	dilatory	and	
incremental	 procedures	 diminishing	 problem-solving	 capacity	 etc.	 (Brodocz,	 2008;	 Held,	 2014).	
Thirdly,	more	general	assumptions	concern	an	“overloaded	government”	that	is	not	able	to	fulfill	all	




but	 not	 how	 the	 different	 democratic	 qualities	 of	 established	 democracies	 influence	 climate	





say	 that	 democratic	 quality	 of	 contemporary	 democracies	 is	 worsening	 as	 arguments	 of	 post-
democracy	research	suggest,	but	it	can	be	assumed	that	contemporarily	existing	democracies	are	not	
perfect.	It	can	be	agreed	that	democracies	face	problems	due	to	the	specifics	of	climate	change	and	
their	 internal	 procedures.	 Characteristics	 of	 climate	 change	 and	 unintended	 consequences	 of	
democracy	might	contradict	each	other	to	different	degrees.	However,	some	democracies	may	find	
better	solutions	than	others	to	overcome	their	short-termism	to	be	able	to	deal	with	the	long	time	
effects	 of	 climate	 change.	 Democracies	 have	 to	 be	 distinguished;	 they	 do	 not	 have	 the	 same	
democratic	quality	and	thus	might	influence	climate	performance	differently.	
Arguments	assuming	a	positive	 influence	of	democratic	quality	on	climate	performance	are	rare	or	
rely	 on	 minor	 aspects	 in	 regard	 to	 the	 democracy-climate-nexus	 without	 thinking	 more	 broadly	
about	the	relationship	between	the	two	components	and	thus	indicate	the	need	for	further	research.	
Most	 reasonable	 arguments	 firstly	 rely	 on	 an	 informed	median	 voter	 that	 prefers	 the	provision	of	
public	goods	due	to	post-material	values	and	small	opportunity	costs	requiring	politicians	to	respond	
to	 these	 demands	 since	 they	 can	 be	 held	 accountable	 (Bättig	 &	 Bernauer,	 2009,	 pp.	 286-287).	
Secondly,	more	general	arguments	beyond	the	environment-democracy-nexus	seem	to	be	relevant	
when	 outlining	 the	 concept	 of	 democratic	 efficacy.	 These	 arguments	 assume	 that	 democracy	
presents	 the	most	 powerful	 set	 of	 institutions	 available	 guaranteeing	 steadiness	 and	 the	 ability	 of	
political	 learning	 (Halperin,	 Siegle,	 &	 Weinstein,	 2005),	 that	 democracy	 is	 effective	 due	 to	
competitiveness	 (Wittman,	 1995),	 that	 democracy	 enables	 cooperation	 (Choi,	 2004)	 and	 that	 it	
improves	 quality	 of	 government	 (Charron	 &	 Lapuente,	 2010).	 Thirdly,	 proposals	 on	 potential	
improvements	of	democracy	are	quite	vague.	They	assume	that	 intergenerational	democracies	can	
be	 established,	 paying	 more	 attention	 to	 future	 tasks	 such	 as	 climate	 change,	 that	 deliberative	
improvements	 could	 be	 capable	 of	 enhancing	 the	 future,	 science	 and	 other	 areas,	 that	
environmental	 constitutionalism	may	 help	 climate	 policy	mainstreaming	 etc.	 (Dryzek,	 n.y.;	 Dryzek,	
Norgaard,	&	Schlosberg,	2013;	Held	&	Hervey,	2009,	pp.	8-9;	Stevenson,	2014;	Machin,	2013;	Lidskog	
&	Elander,	2010;	Barber,	n.y.;	Gould,	n.y.;	Hayward,	n.y.;	Leggewie	&	Welzer,	2010;	WBGU,	2011,	p.	
209).	 These	 improvements	 might	 “create	 a	 democracy	 of	 public	 judgment	 rather	 than	 private	
opinion”	(Barber,	2010,	p.	168).		


























to	explain	democracy’s	 rising	ability	 to	produce	desired	and	 intended	performances	 in	other	policy	
fields	by	increasing	levels	of	democratic	quality.		
The	 concept	 of	 democratic	 efficacy	differs	 at	 the	 level	 of	 individuals	 from	many	other	 approaches	
drafting	a	concept	applicable	for	empirical	research.	Simply	speaking,	the	approach	of	many	theories	
assuming	a	certain	kind	of	individual	actor	and	aggregating	its	behavior	to	nation	state	levels	is	due	
to	 such	 phenomena	 like	 emergence	 that	 is	 academically	 not	 satisfying	 (Cartwright,	 2002a,	 2002b;	
Kittel,	 2006).	What	 is	 important	 instead	 is	 that	 democracy	 as	 a	mode	 of	 operation	 in	 an	 ongoing	
fashion	is	at	the	same	time	created	by	humans	and	shaping	humans.	That	mode	of	operation	or	the	
democratic	design	in	an	ongoing	fashion	created	by	and	shaping	humans	has	the	ability	to	produce	
desired	 or	 intended	 climate	 performance.	 This	 central	 assumption	 is	 based	 on	 the	 weak	 positive	
tendency	 detected	 in	 existing	 research	 and,	 more	 importantly,	 on	 a	 distinct	 argumentation.	 It	 is	
presumed	 that	 the	 influence	 of	 democratic	 quality	 depends	 on	 the	 existence	 of	 its	 different	
dimensions	 and	 the	 interplay	 between	 them.	 The	 more	 dimensions	 of	 democratic	 quality	 are	
present,	the	better	they	can	serve	their	main	purpose	of	problem	solving.	These	assumptions	rely	on	
contemplating	 and	 practicing	 democracy	 in	 a	 problem-solving	 manner:	 democracy	 was	 mostly	
thought	of	and	implemented	to	solve	common	problems	and	to	lead	to	a	better	future.	Democracy	
would	 be	 misinterpreted	 if	 it	 was	 understood	 only	 as	 an	 end	 in	 itself	 independent	 of	 general	
performance.		
A	 main	 reason	 for	 that	 expectation	 can	 be	 seen	 in	 the	 circumstance	 that	 societies	 need	 certain	
democratic	dimensions,	 like	creativity,	to	find	solutions	and	pathways	for	major	transformations	as	











These	considerations	 regarding	a	democratic	efficacy	need	 to	be	converted	 for	empirical	 research.	
Therefore,	an	explanatory	sequential	mixed	methods	design	is	applied	using	qualitative	research	to	
explain	 the	 (non-)significant	 results	 of	 the	 quantitative	 analysis	 and	 advance	 the	 concept	 of	
democratic	 efficacy.	 While	 the	 purpose	 of	 the	 quantitative	 part	 (Analysis	 I)	 is	 to	 test	 the	 basic	
assumption	 of	 a	 positive	 influence	 in	 terms	 of	 generalization	 and	 to	 detect	 trends,	 the	 qualitative	
part	(Analysis	II)	focuses	on	how	and	why	exactly	which	mechanisms	of	influence	do	or	do	not	work	
out.	 	 Thus,	 while	 Analysis	 I	 investigates	 whether	 trends	 regarding	 the	 proposed	 influence	 exist,	
Analysis	 II	 creates	 a	 model	 for	 the	 interplay	 of	 the	 dimensions	 of	 procedural	 democratic	 quality	




Overall	 question:	 How	 does	 democratic	 quality	 influence	 the	 climate	 performance	 of	
established	democracies?	
To	answer	the	overall	question	Analysis	I	asks	and	assumes:	
Question	 of	 Analysis	 I:	 What	 influence	 has	 substantive	 democratic	 quality	 on	 climate	
performance?		
Hypothesis	 of	 Analysis	 I:	 Higher	 levels	 of	 substantive	 democratic	 quality	 influence	 climate	
performance	positively.		
The	reason	for	the	expected	positive	 influence	 	 lies	 in	the	concept	of	democratic	efficacy	assuming	
that	democracy’s	ability	to	produce	desired	and	intended	climate	performances	rises	with	increasing	
levels	 of	 democratic	 quality.	 Higher	 levels	 of	 democratic	 quality	 ensure	 	 higher	 levels	 of	 problem	
solving	 strategies,	 innovation,	 creativity	 and	 critical	 investigation	 that	 are	 necessary	 to	 solve	 the	
climate	problem.	It	is	expected	that	a	positive	influence	takes	effect	regarding	output	(policy	targets	
etc.)	and	outcome	(GHG	emission	development)	since	increasing	levels	of	democratic	quality	lead	to	










• Evaluation	 of	 the	 level	 of	 dimensions	 of	 procedural	 democratic	 quality	 and	 their	
(interrelated)	influence	on	climate	performance.	
• Counterfactual	 argumentation	 to	 determine	 if	 more	 or	 less	 democratic	 quality	 would	
influence	climate	performance.	
• Consideration	of	potential	caveats	and	third	factors	influencing	climate	performance.	
• Consideration	 of	 procedural	 general	 performance	 as	 an	 independent	 variable	 influencing	




Thus,	 both	 analyses	 are	 related	 to	 one	 overall	 research	 question	 and	 examine	 the	 same	
phenomenon,	 the	 democracy-climate-nexus,	 from	 different	 perspectives	 or	 different	 levels	 of	




This	 study	 uses	mixed	methods	 in	 the	 form	 of	 an	 explanatory	 design.	 Essentially,	 the	 explanatory	





In	 the	 context	 of	 this	 study,	 it	 is	 reasonable	 that	 panel	 regressions	 are	 able	 to	 take	 into	 account	
changes	 within	 one	 country	 –	 insofar	 as	 the	 observed	 variable	 changes	 over	 time	 –	 as	 well	 as	




2013).	 There	 is	 a	 possibility	 of	 omitted-variable	 bias	 in	 the	 between-effects	 	meaning	 that	 results	
13	
	
have	 to	be	 interpreted	carefully.	The	hybrid	model	will	be	applied	using	a	calculation	method	 that	
makes	 it	 possible	 to	 evaluate	 robust	 standard	 errors	 for	 panel	 regressions	 with	 cross-sectional	
dependence	since	it	is	assumed	that	climate	policy-making	in	one	country	might	have	an	influence	on	
others	(Hoechle,	2007).	
The	 independent	 variable	 substantive	 democratic	 quality	 should	 cover	 a	 critical	 mass	 of	 most	
democratic	 countries.	 Such	 indices	 originated	 in	 light	 of	 a	 democratization	 of	 democracies	 as	 the	
fourth	 or	 fifth	 wave	 of	 democratization	 (see,	 e.g.,	 Fung	 &	Wright,	 2001;	 Huntington,	 1997;	 Offe,	
2003)	 to	 distinguish	 between	 democracies	 to	 evaluate	 the	 different	 democratic	 quality	 of	 already	
established	 democracies	 (Altman	 &	 Pérez-Liñán,	 2002;	 Berg-Schlosser,	 2004;	 Diamond	 &	Morlino,	
2004;	 Plattner,	 2004).	 So	 far,	 only	 the	 Democracy	 Barometer	 is	 sensitive	 enough	 for	 differences	
between	democracies	 and	provides	 data	 for	 70	 countries	 from	1990-2012	 (Democracy-Barometer,	
2015).	
The	dependent	variable	climate	performance	should	cover	as	many	country-years	of	the	Democracy	
Barometer	 as	 possible.	Of	 course,	 the	 index	 should	maintain	 coherency,	 objectivity,	 reliability	 and	
validity.	Having	a	closer	 look	at	existing	 indices	and	approaches	measuring	climate	performance,	 it	
remains	 that	 many	 of	 them	 are	 conceptually	 quite	 convincing	 like	 the	WWF	 Climate	 Score	 Cards	
(WWF	&	Ecofys,	2009),	(EU)	Climate	Action	Tracker	(Ecofys	&	Analytics,	2015),	Index	of	Climate	Policy	







































































































































Analysis	 II	 asks	 what	 mechanisms	 exist	 between	 procedural	 democratic	 quality	 and	 climate	
performance.	 To	 answer	 the	 question,	 Analysis	 II	 investigates	 a	 case	 study	 on	 Canada’s	 Kyoto	
Protocol	 process.	 The	 approach	 is	 the	 application	 of	 process	 tracing	 as	 a	 procedure	 that	 enables	
counterfactual	analysis	based	on	a	deviant	case.	
A	deviant	case	is	needed	that	allows	the	challenging	of	the	detected	trends	of	Analysis	I	and	enables	











reaches	 the	 highest	 possible	 scores	 in	 the	 indices	 of	 Polity	 VI	 and	 Freedom	 House	 as	 well	 as	 a	
position	 among	 the	 ten	 most	 democratic	 countries	 on	 the	 Democracy	 Barometer.	 Thus,	 Canada	
appears	to	be	a	fitting	example	in	regard	to	the	main	aim	of	the	case	study	in	form	of	the	exploration	











A	 procedure	 that	 allows	 the	 exploration	 of	 causal	 mechanisms	 between	 procedural	 democratic	
quality	and	climate	performance	is	process	tracing.	Therefore,	data	collection	is	based	on	documents	
and	 expert	 interviews	 that	will	 be	 analysed	 by	 content	 analysis.	 Process	 tracing	 focuses	 on	 causal	
mechanisms	 of	 the	 phenomenon	 under	 investigation	 and	 explains	 the	 precise	 kind	 of	 influence	
between	 an	 independent	 variable	 such	 as	 democratic	 quality	 and	 a	 dependent	 variable	 such	 as	
climate	performance	that	a	quantitative	analysis	cannot	take	into	consideration	(George	&	Bennett,	
2005,	pp.	206-207).	
Based	 on	 the	 research	 question	 of	 Analysis	 II,	 an	 operationalization	 is	 required	 for	 procedural	
democratic	 quality,	 procedural	 general	 performance	 and	 climate	 performance.	 Procedural	
democratic	 quality	 is	 consequently	 developed	 along	 the	 identified	 dimensions.	 Every	 dimension	 is	
empirically	 translated	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 research	 into	 the	 context	 of	 a	 democratic	 nation	 state’s	
policy	 process	 at	 an	 intermestic	 level.	 Thereafter,	 indicators	 are	 identified	 that	 represent	 the	
empirically	translated	dimension.	This	table	is	combined	with	a	column	on	climate	performance	and	
the	 concept	 of	 procedural	 general	 performance	 to	 be	 able	 to	 fill	 in	 any	 influences	 between	
procedural	 democratic	 quality	 and	 procedural	 general	 performance	 that	 may	 influence	 climate	
performance.	Climate	performance	can	be	separated	in	output	(results	of	formulation	of	policies	in	




















































































































































































































































































































































































society	(science)	 John	Stone	 climate	scientist	for	years	involved	in	climate	policy-making	 29st	January	2014	
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media	 Jeffrey	Simpson	 Journalist	with	The	Globe	and	Mail	 30th	January	2014	
media	 Mike	De	Souza	 Journalist	with	Postmedia	News	 28th	January	2014	








The	 analysis	 proceeds	 by	 applying	 a	 test	 to	 cross	 sectional	 dependence	 (CSD)	 and	 a	 Hausman	 test,	
followed	by	panel	regressions	including	a	description	and	comparison	of	the	results	before	a	conclusion	
discusses	the	findings	concerning	the	research	question	and	hypothesis.	
In	 the	context	of	 this	study,	a	 testing	of	CSD	examines	whether	the	different	countries	 influence	each	
other	so	that	it	can	be	controlled	for	the	influence	one	country	might	have	on	another	country.	The	test	
implements	 two	 semi-parametric	 tests	 (Frees,	 1995,	 2004;	 Friedman,	 1937)	 and	 one	 parametric	
procedure	(Pesaran,	2004).	The	null	hypothesis	assumes	that	the	residuals	are	not	correlated.	The	null	
hypothesis	has	to	be	rejected	if	p<0.05.	The	CSD	is	calculated	in	minimized	FE	and	RE	models	including	










dembar	 CCPI	 .0000	 .0000	
dembar	 emissiondevelopmentCCPI	 .0000	 .0000	




thus	 CSD	 exists.	 Moreover,	 the	 assumption	 that	 substantive	 democratic	 quality	 in	 one	 country	
influences	 substantive	 democratic	 quality	 in	 other,	 e.g.	 neighbouring	 countries,	 is	 also	 theoretically	




The	 null	 hypothesis	 assumes	 that	 the	 preferred	model	 is	 random	 vs.	 fixed	 effects	 (Greene,	 2008,	 pp.	
180-251).	More	precisely,	 the	null	 hypothesis	 assumes	 that	 the	unique	errors	are	not	 correlated	with	
the	regressors	and	thus	the	random	effects	estimators	are	the	same	as	the	fixed	effects	estimators.	The	














The	 Hausman	 test	 delivers	 mixed	 results.	 In	 case	 of	 the	 emission	 development	 component	 the	 null	









possible	 biases	 due	 to	 omitted	 variable	 biases.	 However,	 due	 to	 the	 high	 dominance	 of	 between	
variance	it	seems	reasonable	to	reject	results	not	directly	but	to	consider	whether	these	are	reasonably	




For	 each	 climate	 performance	 components	 two	 models	 are	 calculated.	 The	 small	 model	 (Model	 1)	
includes	only	 four	key	variables	that	are	assumed	to	 influence	climate	performance	 immensely.	These	
are	substantive	democratic	quality,	oil,	gas	and	coal	production,	income	as	GDP	per	capita	and	climate	




































tradeopenness	 	 	 7.3575*	(2.4409)	
1.8825	
(1.7167)	
urbans	 	 	 .1518	(.1425)	
-.10928***	
(.0124)	
internetusers	 	 	 .0507	(.0617)	
.1864*	
(.0634)	
population14	 	 	 -1.9658**	(	.4221)	
2.3508**	
(.4633)	
population65	 	 	 -2.0574**	(.4248)	
3.0150**	
(.7607)	







































tradeopenness	 	 	 4.7132**	(1.0830)	
.3751	
(.5260)	
urbans	 	 	 .3180*	(.1014)	
-.0520***	
(.0062)	





population14	 	 	 -.8880	(.6304)	
.7247***	
(.1123)	
population65	 	 	 -1.1864**	(.2212)	
.9777**	
(.1642)	





































tradeopenness	 	 	 1.3343	(1.9186)	
.6630***	
(.1202)	
urbans	 	 	 .0322	(.0905)	
.0376***	
(.0052)	
internetusers	 	 	 -.0268	(.0219)	
-.0347	
(.0211)	
population14	 	 	 .4026	(.3239)	
.2010	
(.1947)	
population65	 	 	 -.1181	(.1688)	
.0888	
(.3038)	










.3653	 to	 .5388	 in	Model	2	 is	 substantially	high.	To	 interpret	 the	 strength	of	 the	effects	 correctly,	 it	 is	
important	 to	 recognize	 that	 the	 Democracy	 Barometer	 and	 the	 overall	 CCPI	 range	 from	 0-100,	 with	
higher	 scores	 indicating	 better	 democratic	 quality	 and	 climate	 performance	 respectively.	 Instead,	 the	
policy	component	of	the	CCPI	ranges	from	0-20	and	the	emission	development	component	from	0-30,	
again	with	higher	scores	indicating	better	climate	performance.	
The	 influence	 of	 democratic	 quality	 on	 the	 overall	 CCPI	 including	 all	 components	 (policy,	 emission	
development,	 emission	 level,	 renewable	 energies	 and	 efficiency)	 shows	 a	 significant	 positive	 within	
effect	 in	model	1	of	 .2447.	That	means	that	when	democracies	 increase	their	score	 in	 the	Democracy	
Barometer	 by	 1,	 this	 causes	 an	 increase	of	 the	CCPI	 by	 .2447.	Additionally,	 both	between	effects	 are	




Within	 effects	 in	 Model	 1	 with	 .3209	 and	 .2829	 in	 Model	 2	 are	 significant.	 Since	 within	 effects	 are	
absolutely	 reliable,	 the	 effect	 is	 strong	 taking	 into	 account	 that	 the	 climate	 policy	 component	 ranges	
only	from	0-20,	which	means	that	an	increase	by	1	in	the	Democracy	Barometer	leads	to	an	increase	of	
.3209	or	.2829	respectively.	
Also	 in	 terms	 of	 emission	 development	 as	 the	 component	 that	 measures	 outcome,	 positive	 and	
significant	between	effects	of	.1113	and	.1718	can	be	detected.	That	means	that	a	difference	of	1	in	the	
Democracy	Barometer	score	can	be	related	to	higher	 levels	 in	 the	emission	development	component.	
However,	 the	 between	 effects	 of	 the	 emission	 development	 component	 have	 to	 be	 interpreted	 very	
cautiously:	the	Hausman	test	indicates	that	random	effects	and	thus	perhaps	between	effects	would	not	




Overall,	 there	 is	 strong	evidence	of	 a	 positive	 and	 significant	 effect	 of	 increasing	 and	higher	 levels	 of	
democratic	 quality	 on	 climate	 performance,	 even	 though	 certain	 limitations	 regarding	 outcome	 are	
recognized.	 Out	 of	 twelve	 effects	 based	 on	 the	 Democracy	 Barometer,	 not	 one	 turned	 out	 to	 be	
significant	and	negative;	instead	all	significant	effects	are	positive.	Thus,	there	is	no	evidence	indicating	
a	negative	 influence	of	democratic	quality	on	 climate	performance	 in	established	democracies.	 These	






Analysis	 I	 asks	 what	 influence	 substantive	 democratic	 quality	 has	 on	 climate	 performance.	 The	
corresponding	 hypothesis	 assumes	 that	 higher	 levels	 of	 democratic	 quality	 influence	 climate	
performance	positively.	Results	of	 the	panel	 regressions	allow	with	one	 limitation	confirmation	of	 the	





(policy,	 emission	 development,	 emission	 level,	 renewable	 energies	 and	 efficiency),	 it	 is	 reasonable	 to	
assume	that	democratic	quality	and	climate	performance	in	combination	actually	fit	together	and	do	not	
contradict	each	other.	Nearly	the	same	can	be	said	with	regard	to	output	as	measured	by	the	climate	





CCPI	 are	 not	 that	 clear.	 Between	 effects	 in	 both	 models	 are	 significant	 and	 positive,	 indicating	 that	
higher	 levels	 of	 democratic	 quality	 can	 be	 related	 to	 better	 scores	 in	 the	 emission	 development	
component.	However,	 these	 findings	 require	 cautious	 interpretation	or	 have	 to	 be	 rejected	 since	 the	
Hausman	 test	 showed	 that	 the	 between	 effect	 might	 be	 biased.	 Nevertheless,	 recognizing	 the	 high	
between	variance	in	the	data,	a	cautious	interpretation	of	the	results	is	outlined.		
The	following	interpretation	is	only	possible	since	effects	are	estimated	with	a	hybrid	model	allowing	to	
differentiate	 changes	 within	 one	 country	 as	 well	 as	 heterogeneity	 between	 countries.	 The	
argumentation,	which	is	related	to	the	results	of	the	climate	policy	component,	is	as	follows:	Countries	
becoming	 more	 democratic	 also	 increase	 their	 climate	 policy	 performance.	 However,	 there	 is	 no	
significance	 in	 the	 between	models.	 An	 explanation	might	 lie	 in	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 application	 of	 new	
modes	or	improvements	of	democratic	quality	are	often	related	to	specific	policy	subfields.	When	such	
formulation	takes	place,	people,	politicians	and	other	actors	are	motivated	to	use	these	new	democratic	
tools	and	are	ambitious	 in	producing	 substantial	policies.	However,	 that	effect	 seems	 to	be	 irrelevant	
once	 the	 increase	 of	 substantive	 democratic	 quality	 has	 taken	 place	 since	 the	 enthusiasm	 from	 the	
starting	phase	recedes.	Comparing	the	findings	from	the	emission	development	component	with	those	
of	the	climate	policy	component,	the	significant	positive	effect	moves	from	within	to	between	models,	
which	may	 be	 explained	 as	 follows:	 while	 the	 process	 of	 establishing	 new	 democratic	 procedures	 is	
often	 related	 to	 the	 formulation	 of	 policies,	 the	 implementation	 and	 thus	 the	 influence	 of	 emission	
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development	takes	place	 in	existing	democratic	 institutions	that	are	not	 likely	to	change	which	 is	why	
the	 between	 component	 is	 more	 important.	 This	 supposed	 pattern	 is	 tentative,	 in	 need	 of	 further	





to	be	 treated	with	certain	 limitations.	Analysis	 I	endorses	 the	outlined	concept	of	democratic	efficacy	
assuming	 that	 the	 ability	 to	 produce	 desired	 or	 intended	 climate	 performance	 rises	 with	 increasing	
levels	 of	 democratic	 quality.	 Certainly,	 one	 general	 limitation	 of	 panel	 regressions	 is	 their	 limited	
probabilistic	 character	allowing	no	 “possibilistic”	 interpretations	with	 the	 inclusion	of	 counterfactuals,	
alternative	developments	etc.	The	findings	rely	on	historic	performances	and	thus	provide	no	possibility	
space	which	is	why	a	qualitative	analysis	follows	this	quantitative	analysis.	Thus,	Analysis	II	does	not	only	
verify	or	 reject	 the	results	of	Analysis	 I	 through	the	exploration	of	mechanisms	that	examine	whether	









explored	 mechanisms	 indicate	 that	 decreasing	 levels	 of	 democratic	 quality	 influence	 climate	
performance	negatively.	Hence,	 findings	point	 into	the	 logically	same	direction	as	Analysis	 I	and	verify	
the	 detected	 positive	 trend.	 The	 identified	 mechanisms	 between	 procedural	 democratic	 quality	 and	
climate	 performance	 even	 indicate	 that	 with	 increasing	 levels	 of	 democratic	 quality	 the	 positive	
influence	 becomes	more	 predictable	 and	 stronger.	 This	 assumption	 is	 based	 on	 the	 observation	 that	
dimensions	of	procedural	democratic	quality	form	mechanisms	through	which	they	influence	each	other	
and	 thereby	 climate	 performance	 positively,	 such	 as	 transparency	 ensuring	 accountability	 requiring	
higher	levels	of	inclusiveness	and	participation	resulting	in	more	responsiveness	and	less	dominance	of	
particular	 interests	 etc.	 Thus,	 there	 is	 a	 positive	 kind	 of	 self-enhancement	 of	 existent	 dimensions	 of	
procedural	 democratic	 quality	 that	 increases	 the	 ability	 to	 produce	 desired	 and	 intended	 climate	








Federal	 government	 has	 two	 tasks	 or	 roles:	 (1)	 To	 develop	 and	 implement	 federal	 law	 and	 (2)	 to	
coordinate	the	provinces	so	they	implement	the	law	(Lucas	&	Yearsley,	2011).	This	case	study	focuses	on	
these	 two	 roles	without	 taking	 a	 deeper	 look	 inside	 provinces	 and	 territories.	 The	 reason	 lies	 in	 the	
shared	jurisdictional	authority:	The	federal	government	has	the	right	to	formulate	and	sign	international	
treaties	 like	 the	 Kyoto	 Protocol	 but	 provinces	 and	 territories	 own	 e.g.	 natural	 resources.	 Shared	








force	 established	 after	 the	 conference	 1988.	 The	 target	 became	 part	 of	 the	 federal	 government’s	
“Canada’s	 Green	 Plan	 for	 a	 Healthy	 Environment”	 1990.	 In	 the	 same	 year,	 federal,	 provincial	 and	
territorial	governments	released	a	“National	Strategy	on	Global	Warming”	with	the	same	target.	
In	1992	Canada	signed	and	ratified	the	UNFCCC	as	the	first	 industrialised	country.	Also	 in	1992,	a	first	
Joint	 Ministers	 Meeting	 (JMM)	 took	 place	 as	 a	 collaboration	 between	 the	 CCME	 and	 the	 Council	 of	
Energy	 Ministers	 (CEM)	 to	 elaborate	 the	 further	 planning	 of	 Canada’s	 climate	 policy.	 In	 1993,	 Jean	
Chrétien	 (Liberal	 Party)	 came	 into	 office	 as	 new	 PM.	 As	 a	 result	 of	 the	 previously	 started	 process,	
“Canada’s	 National	 Action	 Program	 on	 Climate	 Change”	 as	 the	 first	 overall	 program	was	 released	 in	
1995	by	federal,	provincial	and	territorial	governments.		
In	1997	at	the	Conference	of	the	Parties	(COP)	in	Kyoto,	Canada	agreed	to	a	6%	reduction	target	below	
1990	 levels	 between	 2008-2012,	 even	 though	 the	 JMM	 agreed	 in	 advance	 of	 the	 conference	 to	
stabilisation.	After	Canada	signed	the	Kyoto	Protocol	in	1998,	First	Ministers	(PMs	at	federal,	provincial	
and	 territorial	 level)	 established	 an	 intense	 National	 Climate	 Change	 Process	 (NCCP)	 to	 develop	 an	
implementation	 strategy	 concerning	whether	 and	 how	 to	 achieve	 the	 6%	 target.	 The	 newly	 founded	
National	Climate	Change	Secretariat	(NCCS)	organized	the	process	in	close	collaboration	with	the	JMM.	
As	a	main	part	of	the	NCCP	–	besides	regular	JMM	–	a	consultative	process	with	16	issue	tables	taking	
place	 between	 1998-2000	 was	 initiated.	 The	 issue	 tables	 included	 ca.	 450	 governmental,	 non-
governmental	 and	 business	 experts	 to	 evaluate	 the	 impacts,	 costs	 and	 benefits	 addressing	 climate	
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change	 in	 specific	 climate	 relevant	 policy	 fields.	 After	 the	 issue	 tables	 finalized	 their	 reports	 in	 2000,	
national	 stakeholder	 sessions	 took	 place	 countrywide	 to	 discuss	 results	 and	 seek	 input	 on	 how	 to	
implement	 policies.	 The	 process	 resulted	 in	 “Canada’s	 National	 Implementation	 Strategy	 on	 Climate	
Change”	 and	 “Canada’s	 First	 National	 Climate	 Change	 Business	 Plan”.	 Additionally,	 the	 federal	
government	released	its	“Government	of	Canada	Action	Plan	2000	on	Climate	Change”.	
Stakeholder	 sessions	and	 involvement	of	 the	public	 took	place	again	 in	2002	 to	debate	 “A	Discussion	






PM	 in	2003.	After	 the	process	between	 the	 federal,	 provincial	 and	 territorial	 level	 ended,	 the	 federal	
government	 set	 up	 some	 bilateral	 agreements	 with	 provinces	 between	 2003	 and	 2005.	 In	 2005	 the	
federal	 government	 hosted	 the	 COP	 and	 released	 a	 plan	 called	 “Project	Green	 –	Moving	 Forward	 on	
Climate	Change:	A	Plan	for	Honouring	our	Kyoto	Commitment”.	
In	 2006	 governing	 parties	 changed.	 The	 Conservative	 Party	 governing	 since	 2006	 under	 PM	 Stephen	
Harper	 released	 “Turning	 the	 Corner:	 An	 Action	 Plan	 to	 Reduce	 GHG	 Emissions	 and	 Air	 Pollution”	 in	
2007.	Its	goal	was		a	reduction	of	20%	by	2020	compared	to	2006	levels,	ignoring	the	Kyoto	target.	As	a	
response,	 the	opposition	parties	 in	 the	parliament	 adopted	 the	 “Kyoto	Protocol	 Implementation	Act”	
(KPIA)	 against	 the	 votes	 of	 the	 governing	 minority	 party	 in	 2007.	 It	 forced	 the	 Minister	 of	 the	
Environment	to	prepare	yearly	plans	on	how	to	meet	the	Kyoto	target.	Due	to	the	KPIA	the	government	
released	 six	 climate	 change	 plans	 between	 2007-2012.	 In	 2011,	 Canada	 announced	 that	 it	 would	
withdraw	 from	 the	 Kyoto	 Protocol	 in	 2012,	 indicating	 that	 it	 does	 not	 cover	 the	 largest	 emitters	
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Change	 Business	 Plan	 2002	 is	
not	 a	 summary	 of	 the	 plan	 that	
may	 be	 required	 to	 achieve	 the	
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2005	 	 “Project	 Green:	 Moving	Forward	on	Climate	Change”	
	 6%	below	1990	levels	by	2012	 590	 555	in	2012	
2007	 	 “Turning	the	Corner”	 	 20%	below	2006	levels	by	2020	 719	 575	in	2020	
2007	
	 “A	 Climate	 Change	 Plan	 for	
the	 Purpose	 of	 the	 Kyoto	
Protocol	 Implementation	
Act”	
	 6%	below	1990	levels	by	2012	 590	 555	in	2012	
2008	
	 “A	 Climate	 Change	 Plan	 for	
the	 Purpose	 of	 the	 Kyoto	
Protocol	 Implementation	
Act”	
	 6%	below	1990	levels	by	2012	 590	 555	in	2012	
2009	
	 “A	 Climate	 Change	 Plan	 for	
the	 Purpose	 of	 the	 Kyoto	
Protocol	 Implementation	
Act”	
	 6%	below	1990	levels	by	2012	 590	 555	in	2012	
2010	 COP	 15	 in	Copenhagen	
	 	 17%	below	2005	levels	by	2020	 731	 607	in	2020	
2010	
	 “A	 Climate	 Change	 Plan	 for	
the	 Purpose	 of	 the	 Kyoto	
Protocol	 Implementation	
Act”	
	 17%	 below	 2005	 levels	 by	 2020	
mentioned	 (even	 though	 KPIA	
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(even	 though	 KPIA	 forced	










Five	 factors	 seem	 to	 be	 in	 the	 focus	 of	 common	explanatory	models	 regarding	 the	 development	 and	
performance	of	Canada’s	climate	policy	when	reviewing	existing	literature	(Macdonald	et	al.,	2013,	pp.	
37-60;	Harrison,	 2010;	Weiburst,	 2003;	Dion,	 2011;	Glenn	&	Otero,	 2012;	Drexhage	&	Murphy,	 2010;	
Halucha,	1998;	Eberlein	&	Doern,	2009;	Huot,	Fischer,	&	Lemphers,	2011;	Levi,	2009;	Macdonald,	2001;	
Toner,	 2002;	H.	 Smith,	 2008;	Macdonald,	 2009;	 Stilborn,	 2003;	Bjorn	 et	 al.,	 2002):	 Intergovernmental	
policy	 making	 with	 the	 characteristics	 of	 federalism,	 Canada’s	 economy,	 the	 closeness	 to	 the	 US,	
Canada’s	 geography	 and	 missing	 political	 will	 or	 leadership.	 Most	 prominently,	 existing	 literature	
characterises	Canada’s	environmental	policy	as	demonstrating	a	high	level	of	vertical	fragmentation	in	a	
decentralized	policy	field	(Inwood,	O'Reilly,	&	Johns,	2011,	p.	178;	Toner,	2002).	Since	it	is	unimportant	
where	 	 GHG	 is	 emitted	 at	 a	 global	 scale,	 climate	 change	 seems	 to	 pose	 a	 major	 threat	 to	 such	 a	
fragmented	system.	However,	even	though	research	 touches	 few	aspects	of	democratic	quality	 in	 the	










Developments	between	1995-1997	were	not	 focused	on	making	 substantial	 and	 far-reaching	policies,	
but	concentrated	on	very	few	events,	especially	the	Kyoto	Protocol	target	taking	place	at	a	national	as	
well	as	at	an	international	level.		
When	 in	 1995-1997	 Chrétien	 made	 use	 of	 the	 prerogative	 to	 establish	 an	 ambitious	 climate	 policy	
target,	 overall	 democratic	 quality	 of	 the	 climate	 policy	 process	 can	 be	 characterised	 as	 low.	
Accountability	 structures	were	 almost	 inexistent,	 which	 resulted	 in	 climate	 policy-making	 only	 in	 the	
hands	of	the	PM.	Inclusiveness	and	participation	were	very	informal	without	broader	public	involved	but	
with	 enlightened	 officials	 that	 claimed	 to	 know	 what	 everybody	 would	 say.	 Interrelations	 between	
inclusiveness,	 participation	 and	 accountability	 could	 not	 work	 out	 since	 actors	 were	 not	 sufficiently	
included	to	participate	in	decision-making	and	thus	control	the	decision-makers.	Without	the	existence	
of	these	dimensions,	policy-making	was	highly	unpredictable	and	fully	dependent	on		the	government’s	
preferences.	 Missing	 inclusiveness	 and	 participation	 on	 the	 way	 to	 Kyoto	 also	 resulted	 in	 a	 very	
undefined	 and	 nonbinding	 negotiation	 mandate.	 These	 two	 dimensions	 were	 also	 missing	 regarding	
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efficiency	 and	 effectiveness	 since	 the	 credibility	 of	 the	 government’s	 commitment	 to	 policies	 and	 its	
task	 to	 coordinate	 between	 conflicting	 objectives	 into	 a	 coherent	 policy	 was	 diminished.	 These	
circumstances	 may	 have	 influenced	 climate	 performance	 indirectly	 and	 negatively.	 Thus,	 empirical	
insights	1995-1997	show	first	signs	of	evidence.	Low	dimensions	of	democratic	quality	either	lead	to	an	
indirect	 negative	 influence	 or	 have	 no	 impact	 on	 climate	 performance	 at	 all.	 Four	main	mechanisms	
identified	can	illustrate	these	findings.	
However,	 certain	 findings	can	be	analysed	more	specifically	and	may	be	 illustrative	 for	 the	 respective	






early	 phase	 of	 the	 Kyoto	 Protocol	 process	 the	 approach	 “was	 in	 need	 to	 have	 a	 more	 formal	 and	
systematic	way	of	engaging	stakeholders”	(Confidential3,	2014).	
	
Domestically,	 between	 1995-1997,	 no	 broader	 public	 was	 involved,	 the	 selection	 procedure	 was	
unspecified	and	environmental	and	industry	groups	were	not	brought	together	systematically.	In	such	a	
setting	 it	 is	 almost	 impossible	 to	 trace	 back	 results	 to	 decision-makers	 (vertical	 accountability)	 or	 to	
control	 decision-makers	 (horizontal	 accountability).	 Due	 to	 these	 circumstances,	 the	 executive	
dominates	policy-making;	particularly	the	PM	can	act	according	to	his	preferences.	
A	second	finding	is	the	detected	indirect	mechanism	of	inclusiveness	and	participation	in	the	procedural	
general	 performance	 dimension	 of	 effectiveness	 and	 efficiency,	 especially	 on	 the	 credibility	 of	 the	




national	 consensual	 target	 for	negotiations	at	COP	3,	which	was	 seen	 in	a	 stabilization	of	GHG	 to	1990	






participation	 structure	 that	 would	 have	 rendered	 any	 consensus	 more	 legitimate	 and	 binding,	 the	
negotiation	 mandate	 was	 very	 clear	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	 the	 provinces	 	 (stabilization)	 while	 the	
federal	 government	 interpreted	 it	 as	 non-binding.	 Thus,	 inclusiveness	 and	 participation	 seem	 to	 be	 a	
precondition	for	functioning	effectiveness,	efficiency	and	a	better	climate	performance.		





to	 international	 level	where	“out	of	 the	blue”	 the	Canadian	government	came	 in	with	minus	6%	below	
1990	levels	between	2008-2012	during	the	negotiations	at	COP	3	as	its	contribution	to	the	Kyoto	Protocol	





“But	a	decision	was	made	 in	 the	end	by	 the	Prime	Minister	 after	 consultations	on	 the	phone	 from	 the	
Kyoto	 with	 two	 Ministers	 and	 me	 and	 the	 Prime	 Minister	 at	 the	 other	 end.	 And	 the	 Prime	 Minister	
decided	that	we	would	do	instead	of	doing	a	little	bit	more	than	the	Americans	we	do	a	little	bit	less.	(…).	











public	discourse.	And	 that,	of	 course,	 is	what	we	should	have	 started	engaging	much	earlier	 than	what	
happened.”	(Confidential1,	2014)	
	




The	consequence	of	 the	missing	 transmission	belt	between	 the	national	and	 international	 level	was	a	
certain	 kind	 of	 afterward-responsiveness	 the	 federal	 government	 had	 to	 ensure	 in	 form	 of	 a	 NCCP,	
which	was	established	after	the	COP	in	Kyoto,	to	bring	provinces	and	territories	as	well	as	other	actors	
back	 in	 that	 were	 not	 part	 of	 the	 decision	 of	 the	 minus	 6%	 target.	 The	 years	 1998-2002	 were	 very	
intense	 regarding	 the	 democracy-climate-nexus	 at	 the	 national	 and	 federal	 level,	 but	 ended	 in	 futile	
consultations.	 At	 national	 level	 a	 precondition	 existed	 in	 terms	 of	 governmental	 capability,	 efficiency	
and	effectiveness	by	defining	a	management	role	for	the	NCCS	and	a	purpose	for	the	NCCP.	Even	though	




not	 only	 be	 measured	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 question	 whether	 higher	 or	 lower	 democratic	 quality	 has	 a	
positive	 or	 negative	 influence	 on	 climate	 performance.	 Instead,	 interdependencies	 and	 interrelations	
31	
	
characterize	 the	 type	of	 influence:	While	 inclusiveness	 alone	had	 a	 negative	 impact,	 there	 is	 a	 sound	
argument	to	assume	a	positive	influence	if	participation	structures	had	been	existent.		
Almost	 the	same	applies	 to	explaining	 transparency	 and	publicity.	At	 federal	 level,	procedural	general	
performance	 in	 form	 of	 capability,	 efficiency	 and	 effectiveness	 was	 again	 a	 precondition	 for	 the	




aware	 of	 what	 an	 adequate	 democratic	 policy	 process	 design	 should	 comprise.	 As	 at	 national	 level,	
inclusiveness	 of	 stakeholder	 sessions	 was	 organized	 rather	 well,	 while	 participation	 structures	 were	
completely	missing	due	to	a	government	that	had	already	decided	beforehand	which	option	it	prefers.	






are	 substantially	 present,	 their	 interrelations	 can	 work	 out	 and	 increase	 the	 influence	 on	 climate	
performance	exponentially.	Otherwise,	 the	existence	of	one	dimension	without	 interrelations	with	 its	
counterpart	dimension	can	lead	to	a	negative	influence		such	as	inclusiveness	without	participation.	This	
circumstance,	 in	 which	 not	 the	 additive	 sum	 but	 their	 interconnection	 characterizes	 the	 overall	
influence,	 can	be	 circumscribed	 as	 the	exponential	 influence	of	 interrelated	dimensions	 of	 democratic	
quality	on	climate	performance.	
The	 second	 time	 frame	 is	 characterized	by	 two	developments:	 the	NCCP	with	 its	most	 intense	phase	
from	 1998-2000	 –	 called	 “table	 process”	 –	 and	 a	 less	 intense	 phase	 from	 2000-2002,	 federal	
developments	besides	the	NCCP	including	national	stakeholder	sessions	and	ratification	in	2002.	Some	
insights	into	these	timeframes	may	illustrate	the	above-mentioned	findings.	


















the	 provinces	 and	 territories	 that	 specifically	 defined	 their	 respective	 roles	 and	 responsibilities	 for	
achieving	Canada's	climate	change	commitments”	(CESD,	2001).	
	
Both	 together	 are	 a	 precondition	 for	 a	 functioning	 democratic	 policy	 process	 that	 could	 have	 an	
influence	 on	 climate	 performance	 by	 defining	 a	management	 role	 of	 the	NCCS.	 That	means	 that	 the	
management	 role	 and	 the	 purpose	 of	 the	NCCP	 defined	 by	 the	 (federal	 and	 provincial)	 governments	





Thus,	 when	 the	 initial	 purpose	 of	 the	 process	 is	 not	 defined	 in	 a	 democratic	 way,	 it	 seems	 unlikely	
unlikely	 that	 the	 framework	 of	 the	 process	 can	 be	 changed	 or	 	 that	 the	 participants	 can	 make	 the	
process	more	democratic	and	 thus	 influence	climate	performance.	 In	other	words:	democratic	quality	
and	 its	 potential	 influence	 on	 climate	 performance	 can	 only	 develop	 insofar	 as	 governments	 allow	
(conventional)	democratic	quality	to	happen	in	a	policy	process.		
The	second	finding	is	quite	substantial	in	regard	to	the	democracy-climate-nexus.	While	inclusiveness	in	
terms	of	 involving	almost	all	 relevant	–	probably	not	all	affected	–	actors	 in	 the	process,	participation	
structures	 remained	 almost	 inexistent.	 The	 table	 process	 was	 initially	 planned	 as	 small	 expert	
workshops	 and	 would	 have	 needed	 –	 in	 case	 of	 a	 raise	 up	 to	 450	 participants	 –	 a	 redesign	 of	 its	
structure.	However,	a	critical	mass	of	actors	was	involved	but	was	more	or	less	just	used	as	consultants	
that	worked	on	climate	change	issues	the	government	needed	expertise	on	and	developed	substantial	
options	 and	 modeling.	 Nevertheless,	 participation	 structures	 with	 a	 clear	 purpose	 that	 would	 have	
allowed	influence	on	policy-making	and	thus	responsive	results	were	completely	missing,	probably	not	
even	intended.		
Some	 of	 those	 involved	 describe	 the	NCCP	 as	 a	 “delaying	 tactic”	with	 “two	 years	 go	 by	without	 doing	
anything”	(Bramley,	2014)	or	as	“appearing	in	public	that	they	[the	government]	were	consulting”	without	
doing	 anything	 (Confidential2,	 2014).	 Also	 former	 Minister	 of	 the	 Environment,	 David	 Anderson,	
described	the	process	–	even	though	 involvement	was	organized	rather	well	 in	his	opinion	–	as	endless	
where	 “you	 never	 thought	 to	 get	 to	 the	 end	 of	 the	 debate”	 since	 it	 was	 almost	 impossible	 to	 reach	
consensus	on	specific	numbers	with	all	actors	(Anderson,	2014).		
	
Moreover,	 there	 was	 no	 room	 for	 considered	 judgment	 that	 would	 have	 allowed	 some	 form	 of	







“Just	 in	 the	end	 this	was	 simply	a	process	 that	would	end	up	 immobilizing	decision-making	 rather	 than	
facilitating	decision-making.”	(Oulton,	2014)	
	
“So,	 I	 mean	 the	 process	 isn't	 very	 rational.	 I	 mean	 why	 should	 you	 expect	 that.	 It	 is	 a	 democracy.”		
(Cleland,	2014)	
	
In	 terms	 of	 the	 influence	 of	 democratic	 quality	 on	 climate	 performance	 it	 can	 be	 concluded	 that	
inclusiveness	without	participation	structures	can	have	a	negative	impact	on	climate	performance	while	
it	 seems	 counterfactually	 conceivable	 to	 argue	 that	 inclusiveness	 with	 participation	 structures	 could	
have	a	significant	positive	impact	on	climate	performance.	
A	 third	 finding	 exists	 in	 terms	 of	 creativity.	 The	 whole	 NCCP	 can,	 of	 course,	 be	 described	 as	 an	
experiment	 for	 Canada,	 even	 though	 it	 is	 doubtable	 to	 what	 extent	 the	 process	 was	 meant	 to	 be	
democratic:	new	forms	of	engagement	were	tested,	the	involvement	and	duration	were	quite	extensive,	
a	new	bureaucratic	body	with	the	purpose	of	managing	the	NCCP	was	established	(NCCS)	etc.		
The	 process	was	 “really	 an	 experiment”	 since	 the	 government	 had	 not	 run	 a	 process	with	 such	 a	 high	
public	engagement	before	(Oulton,	2014).		
	
However,	due	 to	a	missing	holistic	 (democratic)	design	of	 the	experiment,	 it	 failed	 in	many	 instances:	
The	purpose	of	the	process	was	not	democratic	at	the	beginning,	also	not	in	terms	of	the	participative	
structure	 applied,	 	 it	 was	 not	 intended	 to	 increase	 democratic	 quality	 but	 to	 consult	 with	 experts,	
competition	between	all	actors	was	only	possible	to	some	extent	etc.	In	the	end,	attempts	of	creativity	
in	 form	 of	 an	 incompletely	 designed	 experiment	 as	 inclusiveness	 without	 participation	 can	 have	 no	
influence	or	a	negative	one	on	climate	performance.		
Based	on	federal	activities	three	findings	exist.	The	first	empirical	finding	is	almost	the	same	as	already	
identified	 for	 the	 NCCP	 1998-2002.	 Effectiveness,	 efficiency	 and	 governmental	 capability	 are	 a	
precondition	for	the	policy	process	to	take	place	and	function.	 In	the	specific	case	of	Canada’s	federal	




supposed	 to	 ensure	 that	 natural	 resources	 could	be	 exploited	 and	 that	 there	was	 the	 infrastructure	 to	
exploit	 them,	 ECan	 was	 supposed	 to	 protect	 the	 environment	 (Cleland,	 2014).	 Thus,	 the	 relationship	
varied	from	“a	bit	formal	to	occasionally	a	quite	toxic	and	occasionally	quite	strongly	cooperative”,	often	
depending	 on	 the	 style	 and	 personalities	 of	 the	 senior	 leaders	 and	 their	 capabilities	 to	 work	 together	
(Cleland,	 2014).	 Due	 to	 these	 characteristics,	 the	 Canadian	 delegation	 was	 called	 a	 “three	 headed	
monster”	since	ECan	and	NRCan	together	with	the	Foreign	Affairs	Ministry	did	not	always	work	with	the	





Since	 both	 parties	 presumably	 did	 not	 want	 to	 lose	 control	 over	 the	 process	 and	 its	 results,	 a	 truly	
democratic	 process	 could	 not	 occur.	 Thus,	 it	 is	 unavoidable	 for	 a	 democratic	 policy	 process	 that	 the	
governmental	forces	at	least	agree	on	a	process	design	that	allows	influential	results.		
Secondly,	 participation	 structures	were	of	 importance,	 especially	 in	 representative	 terms	 in	 regard	 to	
the	 parliament	 as	well	 as	 in	 regard	 to	 delegation	 to	 the	 COPs.	 The	 parliament	 could	 –	 based	 on	 the	
precondition	 that	 they	 have	 enough	 information	 about	 an	 issue	 –	 influence	 climate	 policy	 decision-
making	 in	 two	 instances:	 Firstly,	 it	 has	 the	 possibility	 to	 send	 official	 letters	 by	 a	 committee	 to	 the	
government	 to	 ask	 what	 concrete	 plans	 for	 (international)	 negotiations	 there	 are.	 Secondly,	




One	 of	 the	 preconditions	 of	 participation	 structure	 to	 enable	 parliamentarians	 to	 influence	 decision-	
making	 was	 not	 fulfilled	 since	 “[r]eporting	 to	 Parliament	 remains	 fragmented	 and	 piecemeal,	 and	
summary-level	information	is	still	incomplete”,	why	the	“Parliament's	ability	to	provide	effective	oversight	
is	 hampered	 by	 the	 continued	 lack	 of	 consolidated	 summary-level	 reporting”	 (CESD,	 2001,	 pp.	 1,	 23).	
When	 parliamentarians	 are	 not	 well	 informed,	 the	 department	 can	 essentially	 do	 what	 it	 pleases,	 for	
which	 reason	 it	 may	 to	 a	 certain	 extent	 have	 no	 interest	 in	 giving	 out	 information	 at	 all	 (Kraft-Sloan,	
2014).	 Consequentially,	 the	 department	 “gets	 anxious	 when	 parliamentarians	 start	 to	 learn	 things,	
because	then	it	makes	their	job	harder”	(Kraft-Sloan,	2014).		
	
Moreover,	 another	 way	 participation	 structures	 could	 influence	 climate	 performance	 was	 the	
composition	of	delegations	 to	COPs.	Either	 societal	actors	could	be	part	of	 the	official	delegation	and	





for	 the	democracy-climate-nexus.	The	 findings	during	 the	stakeholder	 sessions	 in	2002	are	very	much	
the	same	as	during	the	table	process:	Each	participant	was	able	to		bring	their	position	forward,	but			no	
attempt	was	made	 to	bring	 the	voices	 together.	 Instead,	 the	government	 reinterpreted	 the	 results	of	
the	 sessions	 with	 the	 conclusion	 that	 the	 participants	 would	 have	 favored	 the	 same	 position	 as	 the	
government	(option	4	of	the	discussion	paper),	which	was	simply	not	the	case.		
The	 summary	 report	 of	 the	 stakeholder	 sessions	 concludes	 a	 “very	 strong	 consensus	 from	 virtually	 all	
participants	 that	 climate	 change	 was	 a	 real	 problem	 requiring	 action	 by	 all	 elements	 of	 society”,	 but	
“widely	 divergent	 views	 with	 respect	 to	 ratification	 of	 the	 Kyoto	 Protocol”	 with	 industry	 against	
ratification	 and	 ENGOs	 as	 well	 as	 other	 participants	 like	 municipalities,	 representatives	 of	 renewable	
energy	 industries	 and	 some	 aboriginal	 organizations	 in	 favor	 (MARBEK	 &	 Stratos,	 2002,	 pp.	 ii,	 11-12).	
Industry	preferred	another	approach,	longer	time	frames,	less	restrictive	targets	and	harmonization	with	






“In	 the	May	 2002	Discussion	 Paper,	 the	Government	 of	 Canada	 suggested	 that	 option	 4,	 the	 Adjusted	















ambitious,	 it	was	not	ambitious	 in	reaching	 its	 targets	 in	a	strongly	democratic	way,	e.g.	 it	was	stated	
that	 it	did	not	wish	 for	 too	much	 transparency.	An	undemocratic	 complicity	 of	missing	accountability,	
inclusiveness,	 participation	 and	 transparency	 led	 to	 unpredictability.	 The	 influence	 of	 missing	
democratic	 quality	 on	 climate	 performance	 is	 neither	 clearly	 positive	 nor	 negative	 but	 can	 be	
circumscribed	 by	 undemocratic	 unpredictability	 since	 the	 direction	 of	 influence	 relates	 only	 to	









p.	9).	 In	 regard	to	 the	2002	climate	change	plan	“a	number	of	people,	who	actually	 listed	on	the	 list	of	




in	 a	 different	 office	 because	 they	 kept	 re-arranging	 everything	 to	 squeeze	 more	 people”	 (J.	 Bennett,	
2014).	
	




The	 second	 finding	 includes	 the	 complicity	 of	 four	 dimensions	 that	 led	 to	 overall	 undemocratic	
unpredictability.	 Firstly,	 accountability	 was	 incomplete.	 In	 the	 previous	 time	 frame,	 incompletely	
established	 mechanisms	 of	 accountability	 did	 not	 exist	 anymore	 and	 there	 were	 no	 ways	 to	 hold	




and	ongoing	evaluation	 systems	all	 point	 to	problems	 in	 the	government’s	management	of	 the	 climate	
change	initiative.	Since	1997,	the	government	has	announced	over	$6	billion	in	funding	for	initiatives	on	
climate	 change.	 However,	 it	 does	 not	 yet	 have	 an	 effective	 government-wide	 system	 to	 track	
expenditures,	performance,	and	results	on	its	climate	change	programs.	As	a	result,	the	government	does	





unpredictability.	Secondly,	democratic	 inclusiveness	was	 inexistent	while	 informal	ad-hoc	 involvement	
dominated.	Openness	and	access	to	relevant	and	affected	actors	were	not	ensured.		




In	 a	 setting	 where	 involvement	 is	 organized	 rather	 informally	 and	ministries	 are	 thus	 as	 important	 as		
those	 governmental	 institutions	 consulting	 with	 actors	 outside	 of	 government,	 the	 role	 of	 officials	







Again,	missing	 democratic	 inclusiveness	 has	 no	 influence	 on	 climate	 performance;	 the	whole	 process	
depends	on	officials	from	ministries	and	ministers	that	talk	to	those	people	they	want	to	talk	to	without	
any	 sort	 of	 formalized	 structures	 for	 engaging	 different	 actors.	 Thirdly,	 also	 participation	 structures	
were	 far	 from	 being	 democratic	 to	 enable	 the	 involved	 actors	 to	 influence	 decision-making	 with	
responsive	results	based	on	considered	judgment	etc.	Instead,	participation	was	informal	but	ambitious	
in	terms	of	active	climate	policies.		
When	 Stéphane	Dion	 started	 to	work	 on	 a	 new	 climate	 change	plan,	 he	heavily	 relied	on	 the	 informal	
involvement	of	 ENGOs,	meeting	with	 them	“one	on	one”	 (Bramley,	2014).	 Since	Dion	himself	was	 very	
much	in	favour	of	active	climate	change	policies,	it	seems	as	if	informality	helped	ENGOs	that	could	much	
more	influence	climate	policy	making	than	in	previous	and	following	years.	To	get	a	more	vivid	impression	





develop	 active	 climate	 policies	 further	 and	 support	 the	 minister	 in	 Cabinet	 (J.	 Bennett,	 2014).	 The	





that”	 (J.	 Bennett,	 2014).	 Bennett	 suggests	 that	 ENGOs	were	 the	most	 influential	 actor	 between	 2003-





ENGOs	 seemed	 to	 be	 intensively	 consulted	by	 ECan.	Quite	 similar	 to	 inclusiveness,	 such	 a	 secret	 and	
undemocratic	 participation	 structure	 allows	 particular	 interests	 to	 influence	 policy	 making	 in	 either	
direction,	which	 is	why	also	 in	 these	dimensions	missing	participation	 leads	 to	unpredictability	with	a	









The	 oil	 industry	 tried	 to	 negotiate	 with	 the	 government	 in	 2003	 and	 2004	 the	 business	 as	 usual	 level	
(Bramley,	2014).	An	advisor	 to	Stéphane	Dion	and	officials	 from	ECan	 told	Matthew	Bramley	 that	Mike	
Beale	and	Rick	Hyndman	from	the	oil	and	gas	industry,	with	whom	Bramley	also	talked	about	this,	worked	







with	 industry,	 to	whom	 they	were	 showing	details	 (Bramley,	 2014).	 Bramley	 felt	 that	 “this	was	 a	 good	
example	both	of	lack	of	transparency	and	of	favoritism	to	certain	stakeholder	groups”	why	he	submitted	
an	 access	 to	 information	 request	 to	 understand	 the	way	 the	 business	 as	 usual	 projection	 is	 calculated	
(Bramley,	 2014).	 That	 Bramley	 knows	 of	 these	 circumstances	 relies	 only	 on	 the	 fact	 that	 he	 received	
information	 from	 an	 advisor	 to	 Dion.	 Otherwise	 it	 would	 have	 never	 been	 recognized	 that	 such	 a	
completely	non-transparent	way	of	influence	existed.	
	
Such	 missing	 transparency	 has	 no	 or	 ambiguous	 influence:	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 a	 relatively	 ambitious	
climate	policy	 plan	was	 developed,	 but	 on	 the	other	 hand,	 direct	 lobby	 influence	 that	was	 not	made	





The	 years	 2006-2012	 stand	 for	 democratic	 weakening,	 observable	 e.g.	 in	 the	 composition	 of	
delegations.	 When	 democracy	 is	 threatened	 by	 elected	 irresponsibility	 and	 an	 extreme	 use	 of	 the	




independence	 guarantees	 rule	 of	 law	 and	 access	 to	 judiciary,	 and	 democratic	 stability	 ensures	 basic	





climate	 performance,	 especially	 output,	 an	 exponential	 negative	 influence	 of	 missing	 dimensions	 of	
democratic	 quality	 on	 climate	 performance	 can	 be	 assumed	 as	 well.	 Moreover,	 the	 importance	 of	
procedural	general	performance	as	a	precondition	can	also	be	demonstrated	in	the	fourth	time	frame:	
many	 politicians	 did	 not	 understand	 climate	 change	 (capability),	 the	 government	 did	 not	 set	 climate	
change	 as	 a	 priority	 (capability)	 and	 governance	 structures	 were	missing	 while	 re-organizations	 took	



























further	analysed	 in	 the	overall	conclusion:	 it	 seems	that	general	procedural	performance	ensures	that	










the	 influence	 led	to	unpredictability.	Since	transparency,	 inclusiveness	and	participation	were	missing,	
they	could	not	interrelate	with	and	ensure	accountability.		
The	 high	 importance	 of	 the	 stability	 of	 democratic	 institutions	 sets	 the	 ground	 for	 the	 third	 finding.	




opposition	 parties	 in	 parliament	 have	 no	 resources	 for,	 while	 the	 government	 	 employs	 myriads	 of	
officials	(Bramley,	2014).	
	
Such	 institutions	 function	 as	 a	 link	 between	 democratic	 quality	 and	 climate	 performance,	 improving	
both	 spheres	 at	 the	 same	 time.	 A	 to-be-established	 Commissioner	 of	 Climate	 Change	 could	 be	 an	
essential	 hinge.	 The	 influence	 of	 the	 stability	 of	 democratic	 institutions	 on	 climate	 performance	 is	
positive.		
The	 fourth	 finding	 emerges	 in	 the	 context	 of	 inclusiveness	 and	 participation.	 The	 degree	 of	 both	
dimensions	was	very	low:	inclusiveness	was	biased,	the	Gazette	process	was	almost	the	only	formal	way	
for	 participation,	 considered	 judgment	 did	 not	 take	 place,	 the	 parliament	 tried	 to	 exert	 influence	
through	 the	 KPIA,	 while	 impact	 on	 climate-relevant	 policies	 was	 centered	 around	 the	 oil	 and	 gas	
industry	and	the	Conservative	electorate.		
When	ENGOs	met	with	 the	Minister	 of	 the	 Environment,	 John	Baird,	 “he	 just	 yelled	 at	 us”	 (J.	 Bennett,	
2014).	According	to	Bennett	there	was	no	discussion,	instead	it	was	a	meeting	during	which	he	identified	
the	persons	who	were	Liberals	and	“that	was	the	discussion”	(J.	Bennett,	2014).	It	seems	as	if	a	deliberate	







Overall,	 it	 seems	 as	 if	 there	 are	 two	 strong	 and	 one	 weak	 group	 of	 actors	 that	 could	 use	 the	 non-	















proactive	and	 instead	 tried	 to	 restrict	every	public	debate	and	an	 informed	public	on	climate	change,	
even	though	the	KPIA	led	to	some	improvements.	Without	transparency,	the	public	is	not	able	to	hold	
the	government	accountable.		














“And	 yes	 it	 changed	 the	 way	 scientists	 could	 do	 interviews,	 created	 some	 bureaucracies	 for	 them,	






The	 threat	 to	 liberty	 has	 to	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 sixth	 finding.	 The	 government	muzzled	 ENGOs	 and	 climate	
scientists	to	reduce	their	scope	of	action.	The	government	systematically	limited	freedom	of	speech	to	
reduce	the	need	to	engage	in	climate	policy-making	and	implementation.		
“A	 lot	 of	 the	 ENGOs	 are	 most	 active	 in	 environmental	 defense.	 I	 had	 a	 lot	 of	 problems	 with/their	
opposition	to	our	climate	change	policy	was	to	threaten	to	import	campaigners,	canvassers,	door-to-door	
canvassers	 from	 across	 country	 and	 from	 the	 United	 States	 to	 knock	 on	 doors	 in	 my	 constituency	 to	




































The	 Canadian	 type	 of	 democracy	 detected	 in	 the	 Kyoto	 Protocol	 process	 1995-2012	 is	 characterised	
through	a	strong	prerogative	diminishing	accountability,	partially	well-organised	 inclusiveness,	missing	
participation	structures	allowing	for	consensus,	but	overall	low	degrees	of	democratic	quality.	Identified	
mechanisms	 could	 counterfactually	 demonstrate	 an	 exponentially	 positive	 influence	 of	 democratic	
quality	 on	 climate	 performance,	 but	 the	 process	 was	 one	 of	 many	 missed	 opportunities	 with	 few	
findings	 on	 win-win-situations	 like	 the	 work	 of	 the	 CESD.	 Therefore,	 it	 can	 also	 be	 concluded	 that	
undemocratically	 developed	 targets	 will	 neither	 receive	 the	 legitimation	 and	 the	 momentum	 to	 be	
translated	 into	 a	 climate	 change	 plan	 (output)	 nor	 be	 finally	 implemented	 to	 reach	 sufficient	 GHG	
reductions	(outcome).		
Taking	 a	 closer	 look	 at	 the	 several	 dimensions	 over	 the	 four	 time	 frames	 separately,	 differences	
regarding	the	way	of	influence	on	climate	performance	can	be	detected.	Observations	on	the	influence	
of	 accountability	 on	 climate	performance	existed	 in	 every	 time	 frame.	A	determination	 regarding	 the	
influence	was	the	strong	prerogative	of	the	PM.	A	mostly	positive	influence	of	accountability	on	climate	
performance	 could	 (counterfactually)	 be	 identified;	 particularly	 accountability	 worked	 out	 in	
interrelation	 with	 other	 dimensions	 and	 ensured	 predictability.	 Independence,	 instead,	 includes	 only	
one	case	(KPIA)	and	no	tendency	regarding	a	positive	or	negative	influence.	Although	for	stability	only	
one	observation	was	made,	 it	 is	a	 substantial	one:	democratic	 institutions	 like	 the	CESD	are	of	crucial	
importance	 for	 democratic	 quality	 and	 climate	 performance.	 The	 existence	 and	 stability	 of	 such	
institutions	creates	win-win-situations.	Contrary,	inclusiveness	is	one	of	the	two	dimensions	that	had	at	
least	once	a	negative	influence	on	climate	performance.	The	reason	lies	in	its	interrelations	with	other	




structures	 the	 involved	 views	 can	 become	 even	 more	 diverse	 and	 immobilize	 decision-making.	
Participation	 therefore	 needs	 inclusiveness	 and	 has	 to	 include	 mechanisms	 to	 reach	 consensus.	 The	
parliament	as	a	 representative	of	participation	was,	 insofar	as	 it	had	access	 to	 information	etc.,	quite	
active	 in	 influencing	climate	performance	positively.	Transparency	was	 interrelated	with	participation,	
but	also	with	publicity.	While	 too	much	 transparency	might	 in	 some	cases	 “kill”	 an	ambitious	 climate	
change	 plan,	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 inform	 parliament	 and	 a	 broader	 public	 adequately	 so	 that	 positive	
influences	can	evolve.	Creativity	 seems	 to	be	 the	only	dimension	with	only	one	negative	observation:	
the	 “experiment”	 of	 NCCP	 failed	 at	 least	 partially.	 Counterfactually	 argued,	 the	 experiment	 was	 not	
designed	appropriately	and	could	have	had	a	positive	influence,	but	since	experiments	always	have	the	
potential	to	fail,	and	maybe	that	is	one	of	the	risks	democracy	has	to	live	with.	Liberty	is	another	one	of	
those	 dimensions	 that	 are	 closely	 related	 to	 others:	 actors	 need	 to	 be	 involved	 and	 empowered	 by	
enabling	 transparency	 and	 publicity	 to	 speak	 freely.	 Furthermore,	 publicity	 has	 the	 potential	 to	




alone	 might	 even	 have	 a	 negative	 influence.	 Additionally,	 more	 democratic	 quality	 ensures	 more	
predictability	 of	 policy-making	 since	 decisions	 rely	 not	 only	 on	 the	 executive	 and	 informal	 sources	 of	
influence.	 Of	 special	 importance	 are	 the	 interrelations	 between	 dimensions.	 Liberty,	 stability,	
accountability	 and	 independence	are	 likely	 to	 function	as	basic	dimensions	of	democratic	quality	 in	 a	
policy	process:	after	rule	of	law	is	established,	actors	must	have	the	possibility	and	capability	to	express	
themselves	 in	 stable	 democratic	 and	 accountability	 structures.	 Regarding	 the	 design	 of	 policy	
formulation	 and	 implementation,	 the	 dimensions	 of	 transparency,	 inclusiveness,	 participation	 and	







change	 are	 mutually	 compatible	 (Petherick,	 2014).	 Even	 though	 this	 study	 provides	 no	 answer	 for	
mutual	 compatibility,	 it	 can	 provide	 a	 partial	 answer:	 more	 democratic	 democracies	 deal	 more	
successfully	 with	 climate	 change.	 These	 insights	 could	 be	 demonstrated	 through	 empirical	 and	
conceptual	 evidence,	 having	been	–	 if	 at	 all	 considered–	 	 in	previous	 literature	 (see,	 e.g.,	Held,	 2014;	
43	
	
Stehr,	 2013).	 	 Nevertheless,	 minor	 limitations	 have	 been	 indicated,	 such	 as	 the	 circumstance	 that	
robustness	checks	in	Analysis	I	together	with	other	democratic	quality	and	climate	performance	indices	
would	have	been		beneficial.		




mechanisms	demonstrate	 that	 the	more	dimensions	of	democratic	quality	are	present,	 the	better	 the	
interrelations	 between	 them	 can	 work	 out,	 which	 increases	 their	 positive	 influence	 on	 climate	
performance.	 Thus,	 the	 previously	 detected	 trend	 can	 be	 assumed	 to	 be	 causally	 effective	 since	
mechanisms	 inside	democracies	 indicate	 in	the	same	direction.	However,	these	findings	would	remain	
empiricism	 without	 a	 generalizable	 explanatory	 frame	 that	 theorizes	 possible	 causalities	 before	
empirical	analysis,	and	is	advanced	by	a	generalization	of	empirical	findings	afterwards.		






































Concerning	 democratic	 quality	 in	more	 detail,	 independence,	 accountability	 and	 stability	 seem	 to	 be	
preliminary	 dimensions	 that	 need	 to	 be	 present	 to	 guarantee	 liberty	 and	 inclusiveness.	 In	 case	 these	
two	 dimensions	 are	 present,	 it	 is	 possible	 that	 participation	 emerges	 and	 participants	 (in)directly	
(through	 procedural	 general	 performance)	 influence	 general	 performance.	 At	 all	 stages,	 transparency	
and	 publicity	 influence	 the	 other	 dimensions	 and	 provide	 information	 etc.	 Creativity	 as	 an	 additional	
dimension	 comes	 up	 when	 other	 dimensions	 are	 given	 to	 a	 certain	 extent,	 while	 undertaken	
experiments	can	 influence	the	dimensions	 in	a	two-way-interaction.	Overall,	dimensions	of	procedural	
democratic	quality	need	other	dimensions	to	exert	a	positive	influence	on	general	performance.	Not	the	





answers	 or	 relying	 on	 empirical	 facts	 alone,	 and	 thereby	 	 contributes	 to	 the	 filling	 of	 an	 important	
research	 gap	 (Cao	et	 al.,	 2014,	 p.	 293;	Merton,	 1949;	 Ziblatt,	 2006).	 Thus,	 the	 concept	of	 democratic	




So,	 indeed,	 different	 levels	 of	 democracy	 are	 an	 explanatory	 factor	 for	 differences	 in	 the	 climate	
performances	of	established	democracies	and	a	democratisation	of	democracies	raises	the	probability	
for	 finding	a	 solution	 to	 the	 climate	 challenge.	Admittedly,	 this	 is	 –	 to	put	 it	mildly	–	a	 complex	 task.	
Thus,	it	is	an	even	more	important	implication	for	research	that	the	focus	should	not	only	be	laid	on	an	
evaluation	of	contemporary	democracies	when	redefining	the	concept	of	democratic	efficacy	etc.,	but		
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